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INCONSISTENT JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS
CONDUCT: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CONTRIBUTES
TO THE CONFUSION IN MENORA V. ILLINOIS STATE
HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION
That many free exercise cases involve claims which seem unusual' to the
majority of our society may be viewed as a sign of the strength and continuing validity of the protection that the United States Constitution affords
religious conduct.' The value of the free exercise of religion is so well
recognized that the cases in which government does interfere with religious
conduct are usually those which indirectly burden a relatively obscure religious
practice.3 Even these practices must be given the full protection of the Constitution to prevent an oppressive majority from deciding what religious conduct will be tolerated. Otherwise, the majority could wield tyrannical power
over religious practice, a situation that the Founding Fathers viewed as
catastrophic and explicitly sought to avoid.' To prevent such a situation,

1. See, e.g., Theriault v. Silber, 391 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Tex. 1975). Theriault (also known
as "Shiloh" and the "Bishop of Tellus") was a federal prison inmate who claimed that his
free exercise rights were violated when prison officials refused to give followers of the "Church
of the New Song" steak and wine for a "paschal type feast." Id. at 582. The Church was
founded by another inmate solely to disrupt prison discipline. Id. at 578-79.
See also United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968). In Kuch, a "minister"
of the Neo-American Church was arrested for the possession and sale of LSD. The defendant
argued that his arrest violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment because psychedelic
substances, such as LSD, were the "Host of the Church" and it was the "religious duty"
of all members of the Church to partake of the "Host" regularly. Id. at 443. Among the
evidence presented to verify the Church's existence was a handbill which stated that the Church
motto was "Victory over Horseshit" and that the Church hymns were "Puff the Magic Dragon"
and "Row, Row, Row Your Boat." Id. at 444-45.
2. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] ....
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the fact that many
free exercise cases involve unusual claims indicates the vitality of the first amendment's protection of religious conduct. In International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Bowen, 600 F.2d
667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979), Judge Pell stated that "[d]istaste for what
is being expressed, and often absolute revulsion, appear to be the hallmarks of the exercise
of First Amendment rights and probably are the necessary contexts in which the preservation
of those rights can be firmly assured." Id. at 671.
3. Free exercise cases have included claims of constitutional protection for such activities
as snake handling, Kirk v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947); Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1942), and the use of peyote, People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
4. Roger Williams, who rejected the Puritan movement, represented this view most clearly.
He considered the separation of church and state essential to protect religion from government. See generally Whitson, American Pluralism, 37 THOUGHT 492, 497-500 (1962) (reviewing
the historical relation between church and state). James Madison also viewed separation as
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the Supreme Court has held that the free exercise of religion is a fundamental liberty protected by the first amendment of the United States Constitution. 5
Although the judiciary treats the free exercise of religion with great
deference, 6 judicial decisions demonstrate that widely varied analyses are used
to evaluate free exercise claims and protect this right. 7 With the recent decision in Menora v. Illinois High School Association,' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has added to the inconsistent analysis
of the free exercise clause. More importantly, the Seventh Circuit departs
from the United States Supreme Court's trend toward greater protection of

necessary so that both religion and the state could best achieve their individual purposes. 9
THE WRITING OF JAMES MADISON 632 (G. Hunt ed. 1910); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (first amendment designed to prevent political divisions based on religion);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (establishment clause of the first amendment founded
on the premise that a union of church and state is harmful to both).
5. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (freedom
of religion, protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment, is essential to the
existence of our free society); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1942) (first
amendment right to freedom of religion is a fundamental right protected from violative state
action by the fourteenth amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (freedom
of religion is one of the fundamental liberties embodied in the fourteenth amendment) (citing
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1938)).
Judicial declaration of a right as "fundamental" is designed to prevent government from
restricting certain activities by specifying and protecting "preferred rights." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 565 (1978) (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943))
[hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. Fundamental rights are protected from all governmental intrusion
that is not clearly justified because these rights are considered so basic to the ideal of individual
freedom that courts regard them as constituent elements of freedom. Fundamental rights thus
serve to set limits on governmental power and majority rule. Id.
6. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1975) (when a fundamental right such as
freedom of religion is infringed, the state's interest in universal education, although very high,
is subject to balancing); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (the free exercise clause
strictly prohibits any governmental regulation of religious beliefs); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (freedom of religion is in a "preferred position").
7. Given very similar free exercise claims, the United States Supreme Court at times has
reached diametrically opposed results, Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(exemption given for unemployment compensation because plaintiff was a Sabbatarian who
was unable to work on Saturdays) with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (no exemption permitted from Sunday closing law even though plaintiff was a Sabbatarian and observing
the law would cause him financial hardship); compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1975)
(state not justified in acting as parens patriaeto enforce compulsory education statute because
such education infringed on free exercise rights of Old Order Amish) with Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state law prohibiting public sale of literature by persons under 18 years
of age upheld even though law prevented children of Jehovah's Witnesses from fulfilling their
religious obligations); compare Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (city ordinance
taxing the sale of periodicals held unconstitutional as applied to the sale of literature by Jehovah's
Witnesses because such sale was part of an evangelical effort) with Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584 (1942) (city ordinance taxing the sale of periodicals declared constitutional even when applied to a member of a religious organization selling religious literature); compare Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (flag salute statute violates free exercise clause) with
Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (flag salute statute does not violate free exercise clause).
8. 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982).
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the free exercise of religion 9 by providing for only minimal protection of
religious conduct. After analyzing the modern judicial approach to the free
exercise clause, an alternative approach to be applied in free exercise cases
will be suggested. This approach is designed to afford the free exercise of
religion the protection it deserves and to add clarity and consistency to the
courts' decisions.
BACKGROUND

The free exercise clause embodies the belief that the individual's conscience is inviolable.'" This belief encompasses the idea that religions should
be permitted to flourish or wither based solely on their own appeal, and
not due to the help or hindrance of government." Thus, the United States

Supreme Court has construed the goals of the free exercise clause as prevention of governmental interference with an individual's religious beliefs and
protection of religious freedom of choice.'" The Court also has extended

constitutional protection to religiously motivated conduct.' 3 Religious con-

9. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
10. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (government has no legitimate interest
in protecting any religious views) (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505
(1952)); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) (any punishment for religious
beliefs is prohibited) (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (state may not regulate the individual's conscience
or freedom to adhere to a religious organization or a religious belief).
11. In a discussion of tax exemptions for religious organizations, Justice Brennan stated
that every group contributes to the diversity of ideas essential to a viable, pluralistic society.
The tax exemptions in question merely facilitated the existence of a wide variety of organizations by allowing these groups to form, and then to grow or dissipate, without being restricted
by government. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
12. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (allowing religious
organizations to give religious instruction to public school students in a public school building
during school time violated the first amendment). Justice Black stated that a state may not
aid any religion in the propagation of its ideas or faith because the first amendment is based
upon the premise that both religion and government can best achieve their respective goals
if each is left to operate freely within its own sphere. Id. at 211-12.
13. The Court originally drew a distinction between religious beliefs and religious conduct.
Religious beliefs, the Court held, could not be interfered with by the state. Religious conduct,
however, was not beyond the state's legitimate regulatory powers. Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1978) (federal law which made bigamy a crime upheld although it was a Mormon religious practice). In Reynolds, Chief Justice Waite wrote that "Congress was deprived
of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order." This statement implied that religious
conduct, as opposed to belief, was wholly outside the protection of the free exercise clause.
Id. at 164.
The Court reiterated the belief-action distinction in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940), but its emphasis changed significantly. In Cantwell, the Court set aside the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for soliciting funds for a religious cause without a permit. The
Cantwell Court held that the free exercise clause protects both freedom of conscience and the
freedom to act. Id. Nevertheless, Justice Roberts stated that although "the freedom to believe
• . . is absolute, . . . in the nature of things, the [freedom to act] cannot be." Id. at 303-04.
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duct, however, unlike religious belief, does not receive absolute protection."4
According to the Court, government has no legitimate interest in interfering with religious belief.'" A regulation which discriminates against a religious
belief on its face, or which has a discriminatory purpose, is invalid.'" The
state may, however, regulate religious conduct in furtherance of an important state interest, even though that regulation indirectly interferes with
religious conduct.' 7 Since 1940,18 the Supreme Court has attempted to
accommodate religious conduct by using a balancing test that weighs the
specific state interest which is promoted by a governmental regulation against
the individual's free exercise interest.' 9 As the judicial doctrines of the free
exercise clause developed, the Court became increasingly concerned with protecting religiously motivated conduct."0 The Court's decision in Sherbert v.
Yet, legislative restrictions of religious conduct are limited by the protection of the free exercise
clause. "The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to
public safety, peace, or order." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
14. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1975). In Yoder, the Court reasoned
that "the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests." Id.;
see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (although conduct may be required by
one's religious convictions it still is subject to governmental restrictions) (citing Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (conduct
must remain subject to governmental restrictions to protect society).
15. See supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. The Supreme Court has held that despite the importance of free exercise, the state may
be justified in interfering with religious conduct. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58
(1982) (a compelling state interest may justify placing a burden on religious conduct); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (religious conduct may be interfered with if it endangers the peace and prosperity of society) (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)).
For examples of state interests that override free exercise claims, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11(1905) (state compulsory vaccination requirement upheld); People v. Handzik, 410
Ill. 295, 102 N.E.2d 340 (1951) (criminal prosecution of faith healer practicing medicine without
a license upheld), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952); State v. Ballard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d
565 (1966) (conviction upheld for possession of marijuana and peyote,, although they were claimed
to be sacramental substances).
18. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (licensing requirement for the public sale and distribution of literature
held unconstitutional as applied to a Jehovah's Witness distributing religious material).
19. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 150 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). If secular
and religious claims conflict, an accommodation should be made which gives appropriate deference
to both. Similarly, the Cantwell Court held that the state's power to regulate must be exercised
so that, in achieving a legitimate goal, religious conduct is not burdened unnecessarily. 310
U.S. 296, 304 (1940). In refusing to grant a member of the Old Amish Order an exemption
to the federal requirement that employers pay social security taxes, the Supreme Court stated
that Congress already had accommodated those who claimed that the law required conduct
violative of their religious beliefs to the extent compatible with achieving the state's legitimate
purposes. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
20. The first decisions recognizing that the interest in protecting religious conduct outweighed
the state's interest in regulation also involved elements of speech and were decided primarily
on the issue of first amendment protection of free speech. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory recitation of "Pledge of Allegiance" and flag salute declared
unconstitutional); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (city ordinance prohibiting door-to-
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Verner2 marked a significant acceleration of this trend toward greater protection of religious conduct falling under the ambit of the free exercise clause.
Sherbert was the first case in which the Court relied solely on the free
exercise clause of the first amendment to hold that a state had unconstitutionally restricted an individual's religious liberty.22 In Sherbert, the plaintiff's religious beliefs prevented her from working on Saturdays.23 Despite
her beliefs, she was denied unemployment compensation because she had
refused employment which required her to work on Saturday. The Supreme
Court held that the state's denial of unemployment compensation violated
the free exercise clause because the plaintiff was forced to choose between
obeying her religion or receiving a valuable government benefit.2"
The Sherbert Court outlined a balancing test which placed significant limits
on government action which interferes with religious conduct. 25 Applying
this balancing test, the Court initially determined whether the regulation in
question burdened religious conduct. 26 After recognizing a burden, the Court
balanced the plaintiff's free exercise right against the state's regulatory
interest.27 In the balancing process, the state had to meet three requirements
to justify the restriction of religious conduct. First, the Court required that
door solicitation and distribution of literature held unconstitutional); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (licensing requirement for the public sale and distribution of literature
found unconstitutional). Dicta in these cases indicate, however, that the Court was becoming
increasingly concerned with protecting conduct covered under the free exercise clause. The Barnette
Court stated that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
319 U.S. at 642. In Martin, Justice Murphy stated that nothing is accorded greater protection
in our society than the first amendment right to exercise freely one's religious beliefs. 319 U.S.
at 149 (Murphy, J., concurring). The Cantwell Court held that the government may not restrict
an individual's freedom of conscience and freedom to belong to any religious organization.
310 U.S. at 303.
21. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22. Prior to Sherbert, the state's interest was declared insufficient to justify a regulation
only in those cases in which a free exercise claim was coupled with a free speech claim. See
supra note 19. Cases presenting only a free exercise claim of infringement on religious conduct
did not override the state's interest in a regulation. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961) (state's interest in a uniform day of rest declared sufficient to justify a Sunday
closing law which placed an economic burden on Sabbatarians); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (state's interest in protecting the well-being of minors found sufficient to uphold
a statutory ban on the public sale of literature by minors even though the law interfered with
the religious duty of a Jehovah's Witness).
23. The plaintiff in Sherbert was a member of the Seventh Day Adventists, who observe
their holy day on Saturday. 374 U.S. at 399.
24. The Sherbert Court held that government may not prevent individuals from receiving
the benefits of legislation because of their religious beliefs. Id. at 410 (citing Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
25. In using a balancing test, the Sherbert Court compared the burden on the plaintiff's
free exercise of religion with the importance of the state's interest in the contested regulation
and the burden on the state in allowing a religious exemption. 374 U.S. at 403, 406, 409-10.
26. Id. at 403.
27. Id.
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the regulation further a compelling state interest.2" Second, the state was
required to demonstrate the importance of that interest with factual
evidence. 9 Speculative assertions or a mere rational relation between the
regulation and the state's interest were considered insufficient." Finally, the
Court required that the state investigate all possible alternative regulations
and choose the one that least interfered with religious conduct. 3 ' These judicial
requirements marked a substantial increase in the degree of protection extended to the free exercise of religion.32
Supreme Court decisions which followed Sherbert either retained the
Sherbert balancing test or, in some cases, expanded the protection given by
the free exercise clause. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder33 the Court
required that the state's interest be of "the highest order" when a regulation burdened religious conduct. 34 An exemption to the regulation was permitted if the state could not prove that such an exemption would endanger
28. The Sherbert Court considered whether the state's interest in the statute justified significant
abridgment of the appellant's first amendment right. Id. at 406. The Court reasoned that "in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation.. . . . " Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
29. Chief Justice Burger stated that merely showing a rational relation between the statute
and some arguable state interest was insufficient to justify a regulation that burdens the free
exercise of religion. Id. A higher standard of proof is required because of the importance of the
first amendment interests involved. Id.
30. The Court deemed the state's interest in preventing fraudulent claims inadequate to
justify its refusal to grant a religious exemption because the state suggested only a possibility
that the filing of fraudulent claims would endanger the unemployment compensation fund,
offering no proof whatsoever to justify that apprehension. Id. at 407. Thus, although it was
conceivable that allowing a religious exemption to the unemployment compensation law would
result in fraudulent claims, the rational relation between the state's goal and the law was insufficient to justify burdening the free exercise of religion.
31. Even if the state's interest was sufficient to justify interfering with the free exercise
of religion, the state still would be required to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would fulfill that interest without infringing on free exercise rights. Id.
32. Prior cases had not held that the state's goal must be achieved by use of the means
least restrictive of religious conduct, nor had any Supreme Court decision struck down a law
solely for interfering with religious conduct. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
33. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Supreme Court held that the state's compulsory
education law violated the free exercise rights of members of the Old Order Amish Church,
who, for religious reasons, removed their children from school after completion of the eighth
grade. Balancing the state's interest in universal education with the right of the Amish to withdraw
their children from school, the Court held that the state failed to show that its concededly
strong interest in universal education would be affected adversely by granting the Amish an
exemption. Id. at 235-36.
34. The Yoder Court reasoned that the free exercise of religious beliefs had long been recognized
by the courts as a fundamental right. Free exercise had been protected even at the expense
of other interests of high social importance. Id. at 214. Accordingly, Yoder held that only
state interests of the highest order, those which could not be maintained without abridging
religious conduct, could justify restricting the free exercise of religion. Id. at 215.
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its regulatory goals. 5 Also, when the conduct infringed upon was of central
importance to the plaintiff's religion, the Yoder Court accorded additional
weight to the interest in unburdened religious conduct. 6
Further expanding its protection of religious conduct, in Thomas v. Review
Board37 the Court required a compelling state interest to justify a regulation
that interfered with religious conduct; it also required the use of the least
restrictive means to achieve that interest. 3 Moreover, Thomas expanded
Sherbert by granting free exercise protection to conduct that stemmed from
plaintiff's personal interpretation of his religion even though the state's regulation did not burden those of the same religion who interpreted their religious
duties differently.39 After Sherbert, Yoder, Thomas, and recent lower federal
35. According to the Yoder Court, an exemption was appropriate because accommodating
the religious conduct of the Amish would not threaten the physical or mental health of their
children, or prevent them from becoming self-supporting citizens capable of discharging the
duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any significant way detract from the welfare
of society. Id. at 234. These factors showed that the state's goals, which compulsory education
sought to accomplish, would be substantially achieved by the Amish community even if the
exemption were granted. Thus, no burden would be placed upon the state by allowing an
exemption. Id. at 236.
36. In according this added weight to the plaintiff's religious conduct, Chief Justice Burger
noted that
[t]he impact of the compulsory attendance law on . . . the Amish religion is not
only severe . . . [but] . . . carries with it the very real threat of undermining the
Amish community and religious practices as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some
more tolerant region.
Id. at 218.
37. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas, the Court held that the state's denial of unemployment compensation to the plaintiff violated the free exercise clause because the plaintiff quit
his job in an armaments factory for religious reasons. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that since
the state denied the receipt of an important benefit (unemployment compensation) to the plaintiff because of conduct commanded by his religion, a burden on the plaintiff's right of free
exercise existed. Id. at 717-18. The Thomas Court then determined that the state's interests
in avoiding both unemployment and a detailed probing by employers of a job applicant's religious
beliefs were not sufficiently compelling to justify the burden placed upon the free exercise of
religion. Id. at 719. In reaching this determination, Chief Justice Burger noted that the evidence
in the record failed to indicate that an exemption would affect unemployment significantly,
or that extensive employer inquiries into employees' religious beliefs would occur. Id. Accordingly, the Court ordered that an exemption be granted to accommodate the plaintiff's religious
practices. Id.
38. The Thomas Court stated that the state could justify abridging religious liberty by showing
that the regulation furthered a compelling interest and was the means least restrictive of religious
conduct. Id. at 718. Chief Justice Burger then held that neither of the state's interests was
sufficiently compelling to justify burdening the plaintiff's religious conduct for two reasons.
First, the evidence failed to indicate that the number of people who would be forced to choose
between receiving benefits and obeying the dictates of their religion would be large enough
to affect unemployment significantly. Second, there was no evidence that inquiries into job
applicants' religious beliefs would occur. Therefore, the state failed to prove a compelling interest in the regulation. Id. at 719.
39. In Sherbert, the plaintiff's conduct was proscribed by church doctrine. In Thomas,
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court decisions, 0 it appears that a balancing test similar to "strict scrutiny"
analysis 4' has emerged as the prevailing method of treating free exercise
cases.42
however, the plaintiff's conduct was based on his individual interpretation of his religion. The
plaintiff's interpretation of his religious dictates differed from the interpretations of others of
the same faith who had no moral objection to working in an armaments factory. Id. at 715.
The Thomas Court did not view this fact as significant. Rather, the Court stated that "[i]nterfaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and
the judicial process is singularly ill-equipped to resolve such differences." Id. Moreover, Chief
Justice Burger stated that
the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the
members of a religious sect. Particularly within this sensitive area, it is not within
the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or
his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.
Id. at 715-16.
40. See infra note 41.
41. The Sherbert Court adopted the same test used to determine the constitutionality of
statutes which infringed upon plaintiffs' right to free speech. 374 U.S. at 403. If religious exercise is burdened by regulation, Sherbert requires that the state demonstrate a compelling interest which justifies the regulation. Id. (prohibition of solicitation of business by a law firm
violates the free speech clause of the first amendment) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963)). For a discussion advocating uniform treatment of free speech and the free exercise
of religion, see Marshall, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment and Religious
Solicitation: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Religion Converge, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 953
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Marshall]. Professor Marshall discusses the Schaumburg case, 444
U.S. 620 (1980), in which the Court held that the solicitation of funds for charitable purposes
by a secular organization was protected by the first amendment. Id. at 632. Consequently, it
appears that the Court in Schaumburg advocated equal first amendment protection for secular
and religious solicitation. Marshall, supra, at 975. Professor Marshall argues that the Schaumburg decision should not be construed as allowing special exemptions for religious solicitation;
rather, that case applied the free speech standard of "strict scrutiny" to all solicitation, regardless
of its motivation. Any differentiation between secular and religious solicitation would be the
equivalent of discriminating on the basis of content, which would violate the first amendment
right to free speech. Id.
42. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit followed Sherbert in International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). In that case,
the court upheld an injunction against a state fair rule which required members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness ("ISKON") to remain in booths while soliciting contributions and distributing literature. ISKON members argued that this rule interfered with a
religious ritual requiring them to distribute literature and solicit contributions among the public.
Id. at 668-69. The Seventh Circuit stated that the state had failed to prove that a threat of
interference with traffic and the public safety actually existed or that the alleged danger could
not be prevented in a manner less burdensome to religious conduct. Id. at 669 (citing Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
The Sherbert balancing test has been regarded by virtually all of the courts of appeal as
the Supreme Court's dispositive method of handling free exercise cases. See, e.g., Brandon
v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1980); Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 482
(10th Cir. 1980); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Soc'y, 628 F.2d 282, 286
(4th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah
v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1980); Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Clark v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Sherbert and its progeny, however, failed to answer adequately several
important questions. 3 For example, it is unclear what criteria courts are
to consider when evaluating the importance of particular religious conduct.
In some cases, courts have measured this importance in light of the teachings
of the particular religion involved." In others, courts have considered religious
conduct important only when a religious authority prescribes the conduct
as a form of worship.45 Also, the extent of the state's burden to justify
43. Because the various interpretations of religious doctrine are based on philosophical and
theological arguments, it is likely that a definition of religion for free exercise clause purposes
always will pose a problem regardless of the judicial analysis used to decide free exercise cases.
The Supreme Court's current definition of religion is unclear. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961), the Court held that the state's denial of employment to plaintiff because he refused
to declare a belief in God was in violation of the free exercise clause. The Torcaso Court
defined religion broadly, and explicitly ruled that Secular Humanism, Ethical Culture, Taoism
and Buddhism are religious beliefs. Id. at 495 n.ll.
The Court's most extensive discussion of what constitutes a religious belief is found in two
cases interpreting the language of § 60) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act
of 1948, 50 U.S.C. § 4560) (1958). The statute required that in order to attain conscientious
objector status, an applicant's belief had to be "in a relation to a Supreme Being." In United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court held that a belief met the statutory requirement if it "occupie[d] a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God." Id. at 166. In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Court held
that "moral [or] ethical . . . beliefs about what is right and wrong" could meet the statutory
requirement if "these beliefs [were] held with the strength of traditional religious convictions."
Id. at 340. "[Tlhose whose beliefs are not deeply held and . . . whose objection to war
. . . rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency" did not qualify
for exemption from the draft. Id. at 342-43.
In addition to these cases, many commentators have advocated various definitions of religion.
One commentator suggests a functional definition of religion. See Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978). Under this approach, courts would
inquire into the role played by a system of religious beliefs in an individual's life to evaluate
whether the belief in question was worthy of protection by the free exercise clause. A variation
of this definition regards beliefs as religious if they are sincere and deal with matters of "ultimate
concern" to the individual. See P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATION 63 (1902). See
generally Comment, The History and Utility of the Supreme Court's Present Definition of
Religion, 26 Loy. L. REV. 87 (1980) (overview of the Court's attempts to define religion). Beliefs
also may be viewed as religious if they are the "very ground of our being," giving life "meaning and direction." See Stahmer, Defining Religion: Federal Aid and Academic Freedom, RELIGION
& PUa. ORD. 116, 128-31 (1963) (advocating a broad, sociological definition of religion). This
approach also has been called the "Descriptive" or "Neutral" definition of religion. See Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection: Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality?, 34 OHIO
ST. -L.J. 15 (1973) (advocating a "content neutral" definition of religion similar to the Supreme
Court's definition in Seeger and Welsh).
44. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
In Woody, the California Supreme Court held that the use of peyote as part of a religious
ceremony was protected by the free exercise clause. To adherents of the Native American Church,
peyote embodies a sacred spirit and must be ingested in order to enter into direct contact with
God. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. The ceremony in which peyote is used
is central to the peyote religion. Id. The California Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that
peyote plays a vital role in the practice of the Native American Church. rd. at 720, 394 P.2d
at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74.
45. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). In that case, the Court made
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a regulation that interferes with religious conduct is unclear. Some courts
have required factual proof that the regulation actually furthers a compelling or important state interest, 4 while others merely have required that the
47
regulation be rationally related to an important state interest.
In addition to questions concerning the extent of the state's burden to
justify interference with religious conduct, the propriety of judicial inquiry
into the sincerity of the plaintiff's religious beliefs also has been the subject
of controversy. Some courts have held that judicial inquiry is necessary to
insure that the plaintiff's claim is not fraudulent.4" It is unclear, however,
whether this inquiry should be limited to evidence of conduct which is inconsistent with the plaintiff's professed beliefs, or whether the legitimacy
of his beliefs also may be considered. 49 The failure of the courts to define
clearly these critical elements of the Sherbert balancing test has produced
inconsistent free exercise decisions.50
it clear that in considering the plaintiff's sincerity not all conduct constitutes a religious practice, and that the intention of the practitioner does not mandate protection of the first amendment. Id. at 109.
46. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the state's justification
for a regulation that interfered with religious conduct was insufficient because the state "suggest[ed] no more than a possibility" of preventing fraudulent claims by refusing to allow an
exemption. There was "no proof whatsoever to warrant such fears." Id. at 407. In Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), an exemption was required because "It]here [was] no
evidence in the record to [support the state's alleged interest]." Id. at 719.
47. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The Braunfeld Court upheld a
Sunday Closing law which placed an economic burden on Sabbatarians, reasoning that a state
may find that alternatives which do not interfere with religious conduct would not achieve
the state's goal. Id. at 608. The Court also upheld a Sunday Closing law in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In that case, the Court stated that a regulation which interfered
with religious conduct was not unconstitutional unless it "rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to achievement of the State's objective." Id. at 425.
48. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1975). In Yoder, the Supreme Court stated that
"[in evaluating [plaintiff's] claims, we must be careful to determine whether the Amish religious
faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent." Id. at 215;
see also United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (plaintiff insincere in claiming
LSD use was for religious purposes); People v. Mullins, 50 Cal. App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr.
201 (1975) (plaintiff insincere in claiming marijuana use was for religious purposes). In determining that the defendant was insincere in his religious beliefs, the Kuch court noted that the
"Catechism and Handbook of the Church" was "full of goofy nonsense, contradictions, and
irreverent expressions." 288 F. Supp. at 444-45. In Mullins, a "pastor" failed to convince
the court that marijuana was an object of worship and the sacrament of his church. The court
held that defendant had failed to prove that forbidding its use would destroy his religion. 50
Cal. App. 3d at 72, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
49. This ambiguity exists because some courts have held that any inquiry into the sincerity
of belief violates the first amendment. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948), the Court asserted that "[nleither a state nor a federal government can force
or influence a person to . . . confess a faith or disbelief in any religion." Id. at 210. Similarly,
in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), the Court stated that "[f]reedom of thought
. . . includes freedom of religious belief. . . . Men may believe what they cannot prove. They
may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs." Id. at 86.
50. The conflict between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause has created
further problems in the granting of exemptions. It is unclear when such exemptions are re-
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In light of the inconsistent judicial analysis of the free exercise clause,
alternatives to the Sherbert balancing test have been proposed." One alternative suggests that before attempting to weigh the interests of the state and
the plaintiff, the concept of "false conflict"" should be applied to the parties'
claims to determine whether they are reconcilable." Under this conflict of
laws approach, a court must define precisely the state's regulatory interest
and the plaintiff's interest in the religious conduct which has been burdened. 4
In defining these interests, it may become evident that either no conflict
exists, or that both interests may be accommodated by some minimal effort
of the parties.5"
quired by the free exercise clause to prevent a burden on religion, or when such exemptions
constitute an impermissible establishment or religious belief. A "strict neutrality" theory holds
that government cannot promulgate regulations based on religious classifications for any reason,
whether such regulations confer a benefit or impose a burden. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND
THE LAW 18 (1962). Rather than adopt this view, the Supreme Court has allowed religious
exemptions under the doctrine of "free exercise neutrality." TRIBE, supra note 5, § 14-4, at
820-23. Basically, this doctrine recognizes that equal treatment requires exemptions to account
for the different ways in which government action burdens various religions. "Strict neutrality"
would result in the disparate treatment of religions by being religion-blind; "free exercise
neutrality," however, attempts to equalize this treatment by allowing exemptions. Id. Recognizing
this, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court stated that exemptions may reflect
merely the government's attempt to remain neutral in the face of religious differences, and
do not represent an entanglement of religion and the state which would violate the establishment clause. Id. at 409. Nevertheless, the problem remains as to when aid to religion oversteps
the assistance required by the free exercise clause and becomes a violation of the establishment
clause. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 14-4, at 822-23.
51. See, e.g., Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of
Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 816-21 (1978) (advocating use
of the Court's free speech evaluation for free exercise claims) [hereinafter cited as Merell; Note,
Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities,
90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980) (advocating conflict of laws analysis of free exercise cases) [hereinafter
cited as Note, A Model of Competing Authorities].
52. False conflict is a doctrine of conflict of laws. Conflict of laws regulates the interaction
of the laws of different nations, states, or jurisdictions, reconciling inconsistency, or deciding
which law or system more appropriately governs in a particular case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
271 (5th ed. 1979).
53. The false conflict doctrine is applicable in a situation in which no real conflict exists
between the salient policies of the jurisdictions involved. R. CRAMPTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS
245 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as CRAMPTON]. The conflict may be false because both
laws are essentially the same, D.F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 89 (1965) (citing
Booth v. Milliken, 194 N.Y. 553, 87 N.E. 1115 (1909)) [hereinafter cited as CAVERS], or would
result in essentially the same outcome, id. (citing Sheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d
942 (2d Cir. 1934)). Thus, choosing one law or the other does not resolve the case differently.
CRAMPTON, supra, at 246.
54. Professor Cavers writes that a court should inquire into both the terms and goals of
the conflicting rules of law, and into their connection with the event or transaction creating
the controversy. CAVERS, supra note 53, at 88. He calls this inquiry "the ordinary processes
of construction and interpretation." Id.
55. The conflict may be "false" because both laws are essentially the same or would result
in essentially the same outcome. Id. at 89. Also, in certain cases the conflicts can be avoided
when an evaluation of the facts reveals significant connections with one of the laws involved
and inconsequential connections to the other law so that the application of the former law
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Additionally, there is support for adopting other aspects of a conflict of
laws approach to reconcile the inconsistencies which result from the application of a balancing test in free exercise cases. 6 A conflict of laws approach
to free exercise cases suggests that individuals behave under two distinct bodies
of law: religious and secular. 7 When religious conduct conflicts with secular
law, the courts need determine only whether the behavior is more
appropriately governed by religious or secular laws. Thus, when an individual
is acting within the sphere properly governed by religious law, the state may
not interfere with that behavior. 8
STATEMENT

OF THE CASE

The Illinois High School Association (IHSA) is a private organization that
supervises, and promulgates rules which govern, interscholastic high school
sports in Illinois. 9 Virtually all of the state's high schools, both public and
private, are members of the association."0 An IHSA rule prohibits basketball players from wearing any headgear, other than headbands, during
games." The IHSA sought to enforce this rule against two orthodox Jewish
high schools in Chicago whose players insisted upon wearing yarmulkes during
games. 2 The religious beliefs of these basketball players require that their
heads remain covered at all times. 3 Although this requirement is subject
to a limited number of exceptions," playing basketball is not one of them.
The two high schools, the members of the basketball teams, and the team
members' parents filed suit against the IHSA claiming that the "no
headwear" rule was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs argued that the rule violated
the free exercise clause of the first amendment by forcing them to choose
between playing basketball without their yarmulkes, thereby violating their
religion's command, or withdrawing from interscholastic basketball.65 The
IHSA claimed that the rule was a necessary and reasonable safety measure

is clearly more appropriate. Id. (citing Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906,
12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961)).
56. See generally Note, A Model of Competing Authorities, supra note 51 (advocating use
of a conflicts of laws analysis in free exercise cases).
57. Id. at 366-67.
58. This proposition is supported by Supreme Court decisions. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) (the religion clauses of the first amendment seek "to mark boundaries
[between religion and the state] to avoid excessive entanglements"); Abington v. Schempp, 374

U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("[Ilt is not within the power of government to invade [the] citadel [of
the individual heart and mind], whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose [religion]").
59. Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1031 (7th Cir. 1982).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1031-32.
63. Id.at 1031.
64. The only exceptions to this requirement are when the adherent is unconscious, immersed
in water, or in imminent danger of loss of life. Id.
65. Id.at 1031-32.
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to protect players from injuring themselves by slipping on objects that may
66
fall to the floor during play.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the IHSA

rule violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 61 In his opinion, Judge Milton Shadur found that the plaintiffs' free exercise was hindered
because they were forced to choose between either observing their religious
beliefs or playing interscholastic basketball. 68 In determining whether the state
had a "compelling interest" sufficient to justify the IHSA rule, 6 Judge
Shadur found that "[oin the uncontroverted facts [of the case] the risks
posed by yarmulkes . . . are totally speculative," and therefore, the "IHSA's
rule does not pass the conventional strict scrutiny test."" Accordingly, the
district court ruled that because the regulation infringed upon the free exercise of religion, the danger, if any, caused by basketball players wearing
yarmulkes during play was too slight to justify the IHSA's ban on that form
of headwear. 7'
On appeal, the ruling of the district court was vacated and remanded.7 2
Judge Richard Posner, writing for a majority of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, concluded that plaintiffs could completely allay the state',
safety concern and still meet their religious obligation.73 In other words, plaintiffs could devise a headcovering that would meet the state's safety interest
and still fulfill their religious obligation to keep their heads covered. Accordingly, the state's safety interest, even if slight,7" was compelling in relation
66. Id. at 1031.
67. 527 F. Supp. 637, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The district court first determined that the
IHSA was bound by the requirements of the first amendment through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment because the IHSA's infringement of plaintiff's religious conduct
was sufficiently "under color of ... [a]regulation of [the].State" to invoke the Constitution.
Id. at 643 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981)).
68. Id. at 640. Following Sherbert, Judge Shadur first determined whether the IHSA rule
put a burden on the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. Id. at 639. On the parties' stipulation,
Judge Shadur concluded that the plaintiffs' "sincere religious beliefs require them to wear head
coverings," but if they do so they are "prohibited from playing basketball by a rule adopted
by [the IHSA]." Id.
69. Id. at 644. The district court used the same high standard employed in Sherbert, stating
that "lilt is not enough that the means chosen in furtherance of [a compelling state] interest
be rationally related to that end. If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying
its legitimate interests, it must exercise that less restrictive means." Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976)). Only after this evaluation was the district court willing to balance
the conflicting interests.
70. Id. at 645.
71. Id.
72. 683 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982).
73. Id. at 1033-34.
74. Judge Posner acknowledged that the state failed to prove that injuries had resulted
from wearing yarmulkes during basketball games. Id. at 1034. The state merely proved that
yarmulkes fell off players' heads "once or twice a game . . . and that in principle any loose
object on the floor can cause a player to slip . . . and injure himself." Id. Judge Posner,
however, stated that this failure of proof did not show the lack of a state interest. Rather,
the evidence that yarmulkes had fallen off during play was sufficient to justify the state taking
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to the almost nonexistent burden on the plaintiffs' religious conduct.75
In Menora, Judge Posner applied the concept of false conflict to the claims
of both parties."6 He reasoned that such an application could accommodate
the interests of all parties while avoiding the use of a balancing test and
the controversy it might engender." Accordingly, the court of appeals sought
to define the interests of both parties to determine whether a conflict actually
existed. Judge Posner maintained that the IHSA had a legitimate safety purpose underlying its rule."8 Consequently, although the IHSA presented no
evidence that yarmulkes cause injuries during basketball games, the court
ruled that the state had an interest in taking preventative measures against
such injuries."
Relying on statements by the plaintiffs, the court of appeals then found
that plaintiffs' religion does not mandate that males wear yarmulkes; rather,
it requires only that they cover their heads."0 Ths, a more secure headcovering could satisfy plaintiffs' religious obligations and the state's safety
interest. According to the Menora court, the possibility of satisfying both
parties' interests demonstrated that no conflict actually existed." Plaintiffs,
therefore, had failed to prove that the IHSA rule infringed upon the free
exercise of their religion.
The Menora court reasoned that it was proper to require the plaintiffs
to accommodate the state's safety interest because doing so would not violate
their religious tenets. Judge Posner noted that plaintiffs' superior knowledge
of their religious requirements should enable them to devise a headcovering
acceptable to both parties. 2 He observed that the cost of devising such a
headcovering would be minimal. The court concluded that if the plaintiffs
devised a secure headcovering, and the IHSA then refused to allow them
to wear it, a conflict would then exist, and the district court would be required to balance the interests of both parties. 3
ANALYSIS

The Seventh Circuit purportedly avoided the use of a balancing test by
a preventive measure against injuries which could occur due to a yarmulke falling to the floor
during the game. Id.
75. Id. at 1035.
76. Id. at 1033; see supra notes 51-53.
77. 683 F.2d at 1033.
78. In finding a legitimate safety purpose behind the IHSA rule, Judge Posner noted evidence
that yarmulkes fall to the floor "once or twice a game." Id. at 1034.
79. Judge Posner stated that "[tlhe state need not await disaster to regulate safety; the
effort of the [IHSA] to take preventive measures against injury before a history of accidents
has been compiled is . . . to be commended." Id.
80. The Talmud merely commands that "[a male] should not go bareheaded." G. APPEL,
THE CONCISE CODE OF JEWISH LAW 34 (1966). "Wearing a headcovering is a sign of humbleness
and reverence before God is a revered tradition in Judaism and a token of Jewish identity." Id.
81. 683 F.2d at 1034.
82. Id. at 1035. Judge Posner mentioned two possibilities: attaching chin straps to the yarmulkes or sewing them to headbands. Id. at 1034.
83. Id.
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deciding Menora on the basis of a false conflict analysis. In determining
that no conflict existed, however, the court balanced the IHSA's interest
in the safety regulation against the plaintiffs' interest in wearing yarmulkes.
In considering these interests, the court confronted two ill-defined aspects
of the Sherbert balancing test: the weight that should be accorded the religious
conduct that is burdened by a state regulation, and the burden of justification that the state must meet when a regulation indirectly interferes with
such conduct. Therefore, although Judge Posner stated that he wished to
avoid the difficult task of balancing, the approach adopted by the Menora
court failed to avoid two elements of the balancing test which have contributed to the vagueness and inconsistency of free exercise decisions.
In its process of "defining the conflicting interests,""4 the court determined the validity of plaintiffs' claim by considering the importance of the
religious conduct which was allegedly burdened.85 The Seventh Circuit found
that wearing yarmulkes was not "required" by plaintiffs' religion, but rather,
was only a religious custom. 8" According to the Menora court, state interference with religious custom was not as serious as interference with a
religious authority's explicit command.87 Indeed, in Menora such interference
was viewed as a "nonexistent" burden on the plaintiffs' right to exercise
their religion freely. 88 Consequently, the Menora court found that the plaintiffs' interest did not outweigh the state's safety interest, even though the
state's interest was insufficient to justify "placing a heavy burden on religious
observance.""
84. Judge Posner stated that "[a] court, before attempting to balance competing interests,
must define them as precisely as it can, since in the process of definitions it may become apparent that there is no real conflict." Id. at 1033. This approach is similar to the "processes
of construction and interpretation" advocated by Professor Cavers for resolving conflict of
laws problems by applying the false conflict doctrine. See supra notes 53-54. As in Professor
Cavers's false conflict approach, Judge Posner ascertained the purposes of the conflicting "rules
of law" to determine whether a conflict actually exists. 683 F.2d at 1033-34. Judge Posner
first looked to the Talmud to ascertain the orthodox Jewish "rule of law" because that religious
tract is the supreme written authority of the Orthodox Jewish religion. Id. Thus, a false conflict approach inherently predisposes a court toward consideration of religious doctrine because
of its amenability to evaluation as a "rule of law." This predisposition also represents a value
judgment which gives more importance to religious conduct required by doctrine than to nondoctrinal conduct.
85. Judge Posner stated that "the precise nature of the head covering and the method by
which it is kept on the head are not specified by Jewish law. The wearing of a yarmulke
• . . is conventional rather than prescribed." 683 F.2d at 1033-34.
86. Id. at 1034.
87. Id. at 1035.
88. Id.
89. Unlike the Menora court, the Supreme Court, in Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981), explicitly recognized the validity of extending free exercise protection to religious conduct which is not commanded by doctrine. Chief Justice Burger declared that courts are illequipped to resolve intrafaith differences. Specifically, first amendment protection is not limited
to beliefs shared by all the members of a religious group; this would involve inquiry into which
religious adherents more correctly interpreted the dictates of their common faith. Id. at 715.
Prior to Thomas, the Court had held, in Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), that
first amendment protection is not restricted to orthodox religious practices. Id. at 577.
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The court's decision to apply strict scrutiny only when the religious conduct interfered with is prescribed by religious doctrine affords inadequate
protection to the free exercise of religion. Such an analysis places religious
dogma at a higher level than religious customs and traditions, and therefore,
creates an unwarranted distinction between religious convention and prescription. Religious views may change gradually and religious followers may have
differing opinions as to what is important to the practice of their religion.9"
The Menora court's rigid approach, however, does not account for the
dynamic nature of certain religions. Moreover, this approach ignores the fact
that many activities, although not necessarily mandated by religious doctrine, are nonetheless exercises of religion. 9'
The Menora court's approach also ignores the fact that religious doctrine
may be unimportant, or even nonexistent, in religions that are personal in
nature and centered on the individual's relation to his God.92 Even when
doctrine exists, the lessons which can be drawn from religious writings may
be diverse and contradictory, and it may be that no single authority or canon
of beliefs is accepted by a majority of followers. 3 The Menora court's
90. Indeed, the Roman Catholic Church, considered one of the most traditional branches
of Christianity, has a long history of change and evolution of church dogma. See generally
J. DOLAN, CATHOLICISM: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY (1968) (overview of Catholic theology). To
cite one example, in early Christian times, belief in the Immaculate Conception was unknown.
In the early 1800's, however, devotion to the "Mother of God" grew and many religious orders
were founded to worship the Virgin Mary. Although originally banned in France, these orders
spread throughout Europe. In 1854, this movement culminated when Pope Pius IX declared
"the dogma of the Immaculate Conception," which read in part: "If ... any shall obstinately
maintain a contrary opinion [to the idea of an Immaculate Conception], let them fully realize
...that they have made a shipwreck of their faith, that they have departed from union with
the Church." Id. at 199-200. This evolution of church doctrine continues today due to "the
historical phenomena of variation, which . . . allows substitution of our system of thought
for another, regression, ideas fallen into oblivion, rediscoveries, and so on." Jossua, Rule of

Faith and Orthodoxy, in

DOGMA AND PLURALISM

59 (E. Schillebeeckx ed. 1970).

91. See Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1390 (1981).
Professor Laycock refers to a'Roman Catholic's participation in the choir, or recitation of
the rosary, as examples of religious conduct not required by doctrine. These practices are clearly
religious, and although they have become religious conduct through custom and tradition,
rather than through doctrine, they nonetheless deserve the protection of the free exercise clause.
The fact that these Roman Catholic practices are not commanded by doctrine does not decrease
the importance of these practices. Therefore, infringement of the right to recite the rosary would
not be a "nonexistent" burden on free exercise simply because that practice is a religious custom.
Consequently, the distinction between conventional and prescribed religious conduct fails to
adequately demarcate important from "unimportant" religious conduct. Id.
92. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). The
California Supreme Court held that "[allthough the [Native American Church] claims no official prerequisites to membership . . .and no recorded theology," the church followers' practice of using peyote in their religious ceremony, nonetheless, warranted first amendment protection. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73; see also SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADITION
531-32 (W. De Baryed. 1960) (discussion of the Sufti and Bhakti branches of Hinduism, both
of which encompass diverse, and at times, contradictory teachings).
93. An example of diverse interpretations of a traditional authority can be seen in the cur-
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approach of granting free exercise protection only to conduct commanded
by religious doctrine clearly is inadequate to deal with the question of the
importance of a particular belief to a religion.
Providing free exercise protection only for conduct prescribed by religious
doctrine also may lead to further inconsistency in free exercise decisions.
Requiring religious doctrine to compel conduct does not provide a standard
that covers all religious conduct. Religions with no central authority, or with
several authorities, allow differences of interpretation as to the importance
of certain conduct, and therefore, may continue to be treated by the courts
in a haphazard and subjective manner. For these reasons, the fact that an
act is not compelled by religious doctrine should not be dispositive of the
94
question of first amendment protection.
The Menora court also considered another element of the balancing test:
the extent to which the state is required to justify a regulation that indirectly
interferes with religious conduct. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court's finding that the IHSA failed to prove that yarmulkes worn during
basketball games pose a significant safety hazard. 9" The court of appeals,
rent debates within the Roman Catholic church about nuclear defense strategy. A pastoral letter questioning the use of nuclear weapons, released by the National Council of Catholic Bishops,
has provoked an intense debate among Catholics. Some Catholics view the Bishops' stance
as a response to the antiauthoritarian attitude that gained strength in America during the 1960's.
Consequently, they argue that the Bishops are responding improperly to a "trendy cultural
development" which refuses to acknowledge the traditional justification of war fought in selfdefense. Others argue that the pastoral letter adheres to the traditional position on war taken
by the Catholic church. According to a spokesman for Catholics opposed to the pastoral letter,
the debate may cause lay Catholics to speak out on political issues themselves, rather than
follow the tradition of accepting the statements of high ranking clergy. Bernstein, Bishop's
Stand Stirs Catholic Protest, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1982, at 11, col. i; cf. B. LAMB, INDIA-A
WORLD IN TRANSITION 98-99 (1968) (explaining the various interpretations of the same eastern
religions) [hereinafter cited as LAMB].
94. The Supreme Court seemed to recognize this in Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna

Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981), in which the Court explained that religious solicitation receives no additional constitutional protection by being a required religious practice. By
relying solely on doctrine, the Menora court also created a possible violation of the establishment clause. The ruling in Menora may interfere impermissibly with religion by affording first
amendment protection to the exercise of religious doctrines, while denying protection to the
exercise of singularly personal religious beliefs. Obviously, this position favors those who are
dogmatic over those who have unorthodox religious interpretrations. It also may impede the
free development of religion by constituting governmental influence over what practices will
be protected. Although the establishment clause was not discussed by the Menora court, it
is apparent that the court's decision favors one set of beliefs over another and, therefore, the
wisdom of the court's approach also should be considered in light of the establishment prohibition. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the first amendment "forbids alike the preference
of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular
dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) (statute prohibiting the teaching
of evolution in public schools violates the establishment clause). The Supreme Court also has
held that "[tihe law knows no heresy and is committed to the support of no dogma." Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872) (an ecclesiastical decision revolving a church prop-

erty dispute cannot be reviewed by civil courts).
95. 683 F.2d at 1034.
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however, ruled that because yarmulkes that fall to the floor during play
could cause injury, a preventative measure against such possible injury sufficiently justified interference with religious conduct.96 Thus, the Seventh Circuit allowed a mere rational relation97 between the state's interest in safety
and the regulation used to promote that interest to justify interference with
religious conduct.
Requiring a mere rational relation between the state's goal and the regulation designed to achieve that goal inadequately protects religious conduct.
Under such a standard, courts possess too much discretion in determining
whether a regulation which interferes with religion is justified. A rational
relation requires no proof that the regulation actually furthers the state's
interest. Consequently, the test of whether a regulation is justified when it
interferes with religious conduct becomes nothing more than a question of
whether the court believes that a rational relation between the regulation
and the state's goal plausibly exists.
This test imposes only a minimal burden on the state to justify its actions. 98
To illustrate, in Menora, the plaintiff high schools had been IHSA members
for three and eight years respectively, 99 during which time yarmulkes had
been worn in over 1,300 basketball games. ' No injuries resulted from yarmulkes in these games. The Seventh Circuit, however, had no difficulty in
justifying the IHSA rule because, theoretically, yarmulkes that fall to the
floor during play could result in injuries to the players. Clearly, a rational
relation standard fails to provide the high degree of protection from governmental interference which an individual's right to the free exercise of religion
deserves.
The Menora court reasoned that application of the false conflict doctrine
is an appropriate constitutional analysis that avoids the problems inherent
in a balancing approach. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that two

96. Id.
97. When reviewing a regulation under a rational relation standard, a court will uphold
the regulation if any facts, either known or reasonably inferred, show that the regulation furthers a legitimate state interest. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 8-7, at 450.
98. Judicial interpretation of the commerce clause demonstrates how easy it is to find sufficient justification for a regulation when the courts require only a rational relation to exist
between the state's goals and the means employed to reach them. See, e.g., Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964) (the commerce clause allowed Congress to regulate a local
restaurant that discriminated against blacks because such discrimination could restrict the interstate travel of blacks, obstruct interstate commerce, and discourage the establishment of

new businesses); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (the production of wheat
for consumption on the Filburn family farm was within the commerce power of Congress since
the volume of wheat grown by all farmers who intend its use for home consumption may
have a substantial effect on the price of wheat); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117
(1941) (if an employer expects goods which he produces intrastate to move in interstate commerce, he is subject to regulation by Congress under the commerce clause, even if the goods
do not actually enter interstate commerce).
99. 527 F. Supp. 637, 640 (N.D. I11. 1981).
100. Id. at 642.
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of these problems-the importance to be accorded the burdened religious
conduct and the extent to which the state must justify a regulation that interferes with religious conduct-arose in the Menora court's analysis. In addition to these problems, the introduction of a false conflict analysis presents
difficulties in attempting to reconcile the parties' conflicting claims.
The Seventh Circuit's application of a false conflict analysis is flawed for
several reasons. First, the court incorrectly considered only the state's purpose underlying the rule, not the rule itself, to "eliminate" the conflict between the rule and the plaintiffs' religious obligations.'"' Whether the state
has a valid interest underlying the rule should not have been the sole question addressed by the court. Rather, the court also should have considered
whether the rule, as it exists, indirectly interfered with plaintiffs' free exercise of religion.' 2 A court's analysis should stop at consideration of the
state's purpose only when the purpose itself is unconstitutional.', 3 A law
which directly interferes with religious conduct, or does so indirectly for
discriminatory reasons, would be unconstitutional per se. When a valid regulation indirectly interferes with religious conduct, as in Menora, the court must
consider whether some compelling state interest justifies that interference to
determine the constitutionality of the regulation.' 4
While finding that the IHSA had a valid safety interest in its "no
headwear" rule, 0 5 the Menora court failed to consider whether the rule
violated the free exercise clause. Instead, the court merely concluded that
because it furthered a valid state interest, the rule could stand, provided

101. Courts must inquire beyond the regulation's purpose to determine whether its effect
impermissibly burdens religious exercise or violates the establishment clause. See Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973) (holding that a law whose primary effect
advances religious conduct may not be constitutional, even though the state had a proper purpose); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (determining the legislative purpose
of a law affecting religious conduct does not end the court's inquiry; courts must also be certain that the effect is not due to excessive government entanglement with religion); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (in order to support a free exercise claim,
the plaintiff must show that the law has a coercive effect on his religious conduct).
102. Courts must inquire not only as to the purpose, but also as to the effect of the law.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("[a] regulation neutral on its face may,
in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality
if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."). In Sherbert, the Court stated that although
the state's regulation furthered a valid interest and burdened free exercise only indirectly, "this
is only the beginning, not the end, of the court's inquiry. . . . If the purpose or effect of
a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized
as being only indirect." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (quoting Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
103. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) ("If either [the purpose or primary
effect of the regulation] is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution") (quoting Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
104. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
105. 683 F.2d at 1034.
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that the IHSA interpreted the rule as allowing secure headcoverings to be
worn for religious reasons.' 6 The Menora court concluded that until the
IHSA refused to allow plaintiffs to wear secure headcoverings, no conflict
between the rule and plaintiffs' religious obligation would exist. 07
Under the circumstances, however, it is clear that a conflict actually existed
between plaintiffs' right of free exercise and the IHSA rule. On its face,
the rule forbids all headwear other than headbands. Trial testimony in which
the IHSA repeatedly adhered to a strict interpretation of the rule supported
the absolute nature of this prohibition.' The IHSA stated that regardless
of how securely headwear might be attached, only headbands would be
permitted."09 Therefore, on its face, the rule interfered with plaintiffs' obligation to keep their heads covered. To argue that the rule may be changed
in the future does not alter the present nature of the rule, nor does it reconcile the conflicting interests in Menora. Thus, in addition to failing to avoid
a balancing of the state's and the plaintiffs' interests, the false conflict approach does not adequately resolve the conflict between the IHSA rule and
plaintiffs' religious obligation.
Although it appears that the Menora court was dissatisfied with the balancing test,"' its adoption of a false conflict analysis in free exercise cases
failed to eliminate the difficulties associated with the balancing test.'
It
does not appear that the Seventh Circuit would be willing to abandon the
balancing test to adopt other aspects of a conflict of laws approach to free
exercise cases; yet, support does exist for adopting such an approach." 2

106. Id. at 1035.
107. Id.
108. Id.at 1034.
109. Id.
110. In adopting a false conflict approach, Judge Posner stated that "It]he conflicting claims
of church and state are a source of some of the bitterest and most divisive controversies in
our society. Weigh them and choose we shall if we must, but we want first to satisfy ourselves
that the claims really are irreconcilable." Id. at 1033.
Ill. A false conflict approach also presents the same problems of subjectivity inherent in
a balancing test. Professor Cavers states that he would not expect uniform results from application of the false conflict doctrine in conflict of laws cases because:
Itlhere is too much room for individual differences in the assessment of the purposes of laws and of the significance of facts to assure [uniform decisions].
. . . And I do not assume that all . . . judges, will be immune to the appeal
of laws which they esteem when these are pitted against laws they deplore.
CAVERS, supra note 53, at 90-91.
112. See generally Note, A Model of Competing Authorities, supra note 51. This article
advocates viewing free exercise cases as a conflict between competing authorities: one religious
and one secular. Thus, the author attempts to establish an analogy between free exercise claims
and conflict of laws doctrine. Id. at 365. In establishing this analogy, traditional conflict of
laws techniques, such as inquiries into which system of law has the most significant relation
to the contested issue and the purpose of the conflicting laws, are adapted to conflicting religious
and secular interests. Id. Under this approach, the article suggests that the courts' function
merely would be to decide under which law, religious or secular, the conduct in question would
be governed most appropriately. Id. at 370-74.
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Nevertheless, a conflict of laws analysis in free exercise cases raises questions as difficult as those involved in a balancing test.
A conflict of laws analysis requires courts to delineate the area in which
state regulation may not interfere with religious conduct.'' 3 This delineation,
however, most likely would be affected by the subjective judgment of the
courts. Furthermore, the courts' subjective judgment also would be likely
to affect its determination of when an individual is acting within this protected area. Requiring courts to define the religious law that "governs" in
each case alleging a violation of the right of free exercise is a difficult task.' 1
Indeed, most religions are not reducible to a set of laws analogous to those
of a state or government."' These problems are at least as vexing as those
raised by the balancing test. More importantly, they indicate that a conflict
of laws analysis fails to eliminate the problem of subjectivity for which the
balancing test has been criticized.
An additional weakness of the conflict of laws analysis in free exercise
cases is the specious conceptual framework on which such an analysis rests.
A conflict of laws analysis is based on the fiction that an individual operates
under separable and distinct bodies of law, one religious and one secular." 6
When using this analysis, it must be presumed that one particular set of
laws applies, rather than a conflicting set of laws.' 7 In free exercise cases,
however, both secular law and religious "law" legitimately apply to an individual's conduct. Conduct that is religiously motivated is not removed from
the sphere of secular authority merely because of its motivation. Thus,
religious "law" and secular law overlap; they are not separable and distinct.
Therefore, an approach which recognizes two legitimate, but overlapping,
interests would be a more realistic approach to free exercise cases.
SUGGESTED APPROACH

In light of the inherent difficulties with both a balancing test and a conflict of laws analysis, a new approach which minimizes subjectivity in the
determination of free exercise cases is desirable. Such an approach would
add consistency to the courts' decisions by limiting, or eliminating, judicial
discretion to evaluate the state's justification for a regulation and the importance of the burdened religious conduct. Extensive protection should be

113. Id. at 367-68.
114. This function, in itself, may violate the religion clause of the first amendment. See
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) ("Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation") (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("The determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice
... is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question;
religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit first amendment protection").
115. See, e.g., LAMB, supra note 93, at 98-99.

116. Note, A Model of Competing Authorities, supra note 51, at 366.
117. Id. at 366-67.
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afforded to religious conduct because of its acknowledged importance in
American society.' 8 One possible approach, identical to an equal protection
strict scrutiny analysis, would be to allow courts to consider only the importance of the state interest, rather than the importance of the religious conduct. As in the equal protection strict scrutiny analysis, the court could require that the state offer factual proof that the regulation is the least restrictive means available to achieve a compelling state interest.'' 9 If a compelling

state interest is not demonstrated, or if a less restrictive alternative is available,
then the regulation should be found violative of the free exercise clause of
the first amendment.
This approach has several advantages over the balancing test and the con-

flict of laws analysis. First, by examining only the state regulation, the courts
could avoid inquiry into the religion itself. Because of the subjectivity of
religious beliefs, inquiry into the importance of those beliefs invariably would
give rise to contradictory decisions. Therefore, by eliminating consideraton
of the importance of specific religious conduct which is burdened by state
regulation, courts would be likely to reduce the inconsistencies between free

exercise decisions. 120
Another advantage of this approach is that it affords religious conduct
the same high degree of protection that the Supreme Court extended to
religious conduct in Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas. Requiring a compelling
state interest to justify regulation of religious conduct recognizes the importance of free exercise and protects it from interference by insignificant governmental interests. Furthermore, if states are required to produce factual proof

118. See generally Whitson, American Pluralism, 37 THOUGHT 492 (1962).
119. The strict scrutiny analysis has been criticized for precluding the state's interest from
prevailing in many fundamental rights cases. In the free exercise area, however, the standard
of proof required to justify a regulation that interferes with religious conduct should not be
so high as to unreasonably preclude the state from achieving its legitimate interests. United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), furnishes an example of evidence of a state's interest that
was sufficient to meet the requirements of strict scrutiny. In concluding that a religious exemption could not be allowed without endangering the state's interest in the social security system,
the Lee court relied on congressional studies concerning the financial condition of the system.
Id. at 259 n.9. The Court also found that Congress had already "accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive national program, the practices of those who believe
it a violation of their faith to participate in the social security system." Id. at 260. Thus,
the state presented a compelling interest, justified by factual evidence, which could not be achieved
by a less restrictive means. In Lee, therefore, the burden on free exercise was permissible.
120. Indeed, it appears that the Court is becoming increasingly reluctant to inquire into the
legitimacy of religious belief. The Court has stated that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); see also Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious activity
for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment"); United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) ("the miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ,
life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one
could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little
indeed would be left of religious freedom"). See generally Marshall, supra note 40, at 981.
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that the regulation actually furthers that interest, then unnecessary regulations will not be permitted to interfere with religious conduct. Under this
approach, courts would not be allowed to view the regulation in general,
abstract terms; rather, they would be required to consider the regulation
in specific, concrete terms. Thus, only regulations that actually further a
compelling state interest would be allowed to interfere with religious conduct.
Although requiring factual proof that the regulation actually furthers an
important state interest places a heavy burden on the state, no lesser standard can be imposed without risking inadequate protection of religious conduct. Application of a lesser standard might permit a regulation to stand
when only a tenuous connection exists between the state's interest and the
regulation designed to achieve that interest.' 2 ' The free exercise of religion
should not be restricted when the state's justification for a regulation which
interferes with religious conduct rests on mere speculative assertions.' 22
In addition to providing greater protection for the free exercise of religion,
requiring the state's interest to be supported by factual evidence will produce greater consistency in free exercise decisions. Courts would not be given
great discretion in determining when a regulation which interferes with
religious conduct is justified. The state's interest in the regulation could not
be construed in abstract terms; instead, it would be determined by the
evidence presented. A regulation that is only rationally related to a state's
interest would not be constitutional.
For example, in Menora it was conceivable that yarmulkes could fall to
the floor during play, thereby causing injury to a player. Consequently, the
state had a rational safety interest in prohibiting players from wearing yarmulkes while playing basketball. When evaluated under an approach requiring factual proof, however, the regulation would not be justifiable because
the state did not present evidence showing that injuries resulted from wearing yarmulkes during basketball games. 23' A standard requiring evidence that
the regulation actually furthers a compelling state interest would remove much
of the judicial discretion to determine when interference with religious conduct is justified.
Finally, the imposition of a least restrictive alternative means requirement
promotes the goals of consistency and protection in free exercise decisions.' 2
Even when a regulation is proven to further an important state interest, the
court also must examine whether an alternative regulation exists that does
not interfere with religion. Therefore, the state must avoid burdening religious
conduct if it can achieve its interests without creating such a burden.

121. See supra note 97.
122. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
123. Judge Posner stated that "[t]he state need not await disaster to regulate safety." 683
F.2d at 1034. Yet allowing a regulation that burdens religious conduct for that reason does
not afford such conduct judicial protection commensurate with its importance. See supra note 6.
124. See generally Merel, supra note 51, at 816-21 (advocating use of the Court's free speech
evaluation for free exercise claims).
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The least restrictive alternative means requirement also insures that the
state's interest will be evaluated on the basis of the specific evidence presented.
The state will be forced to examine how its interest may be achieved otherwise, thereby necessitating a factual evaluation of alternative means. Exemptions for religious conduct could be established pursuant to an evaluation
of the effect of the specific exemptions on the state regulation. When religious
conduct could be placed beyond the reach of the regulation without unduly
hampering the regulation's effectiveness, the exemption would be required.
Thus, by requiring a factual evaluation of the circumstances of each case,
the least restrictive alternative requirement further limits judicial discretion
in determining when a regulation is justified.
CONCLUSION

The analysis suggested is an attempt to provide an alternative approach
to both the Sherbert balancing test and the conflict of laws analysis of free
exercise cases. By eliminating the court's inquiry into the importance of the
religious beliefs burdened by state regulation, the suggested approach avoids
a major source of confusion and inconsistency in free exercise decisions.
Under this approach, the requirement of both an important state interest
which is supported by factual evidence and the use of the least restrictive
alternative means would eliminate inconsistency in determining when the state
has met the burden of justifying a regulation that interferes with religious
conduct. This approach also would provide the free exercise of religion with
the high degree of protection which has been extended to religious conduct
in recent Supreme Court decisions. At the same time, it would protect the
primacy'of the state in the political sphere. Ultimately, the requirements contained in this approach would remedy the major problems inherent in both
the balancing test and the conflict of laws analysis.
Kurt H. Feuerschwenger

